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Abstract 
The unfolding of industrial modernity has led to high levels of wealth and welfare in the Western world but 
also to increasing global ecological degradation and social inequality. The routine mode of operation of a 
wide range of socio-technical systems, forming the material backbone of contemporary societies, has 
substantially contributed to these outcomes. This paper proposes that all these systems can be seen as a 
surface expression of fundamental meta-rules that for the past 250 years have driven the evolution of these 
systems and system innovation towards particular directions, thereby constituting the First Deep Transition. 
To meet the accumulated social and ecological challenges would therefore require a radical change not only 
in socio-technical systems but also in meta-rules underlying their functioning – the Second Deep Transition. 
This paper develops a new theoretical framework aiming to explain the emergence, acceleration, stabilization 
and directionality of Deep Transitions. It does so through the synthesis of three strands of literature: 
individual socio-technical systems, interconnected systems and industrialization-related macro-trends. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Innovative social science thinking is needed to address the current interconnected social, economic 
and ecological challenges facing humanity. The core challenge is guaranteeing a humane quality of 
life for nearly 10 billion people on the planet by 2050 (UN DESA, 2015). Supranational 
organizations, governments, businesses, NGO-s and other actors need to collaborate in order to 
secure the provision of sufficient amount of food, affordable and secure energy services, and access 
to clean water, whilst mitigating the most severe impacts of climate change and adapting to those 
impacts that will occur (IPCC, 2014). From this perspective, it is clear that the current paradigm of 
industrial mass production and individualized mass consumption based on intensive use of fossil 
fuels and a production of a massive amount of waste cannot be extended to all of the world's 
                                                 
1
  This paper has benefited from various conversations, discussions and debates – sometimes more, sometimes less 
critical, sometimes written, sometimes oral, but always productive, inspiring and encouraging – with a number of 
people. Special thanks go to Adrian Smith, Cian O'Donovan, Jonas Torrens, Tim Foxon, Frank Geels, Carlota Perez, 
Andy Stirling, Ed Steinmueller, Frans Berkhout, Koen Frenken, Benjamin Sovacool, Raphael Kaplinsky, Ben Martin, 
Ralitsa Hiteva, Florian Kern, Daniele Rotolo, Frederique Lang and Caitriona McLeish. We look forward to working 
with all these people to test the framework. 
2 
 
population without exceeding Earth's planetary boundaries (Meadows et al., 2004; Bardi, 2011; 
Steffen et al., 2015). There is a second challenge, however. Despite continuing economic growth in 
many parts of the world, many people still live in poverty. Rising inequalities are resulting in highly 
uneven distribution of the benefits and costs of growth and development. If high enough, these 
inequalities may start to undermine the values on which democratic societies are based (Stiglitz, 
2012; Piketty, 2014). 
 
Many international organizations, business-linked foundations and official government advisors 
have responded to this double challenge of environmental change and social inequality. Recently 
the United Nations (2015) has formulated 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), calling for 
revolutionary greener production, increased social justice, fairer distribution of welfare, sustainable 
consumption patterns and new ways of producing economic growth. Other major organizations are 
promoting 'inclusive green growth' (World Bank, 2012), 'smart, sustainable and inclusive growth' 
(European Commission, 2010), 'a circular economy' (European Environmental Agency, 2016) or 'a 
social contract for sustainability' (WGBU, 2011). However, it remains an open question how these 
goals are to be achieved. 
 
In this paper we assume that to deliver on the 17 SDGs and similar aims will require a Deep 
Transition, similar in scale and complexity to that which gave rise to modern industrial systems. 
We, therefore, distinguish between the First and Second Deep Transition, where the former refers to 
the rise of industrial modernity, while the latter refers to its fundamental re-ordering (Schot, 2016). 
We suggest that this sea-change in industrial modernity has gradually started to unfold since the 
1970s in specific technological and regional niches, not as a mainstream development but rather as 
an undercurrent of historical change, to tackle the persistent 'wicked problems' characteristic of the 
First Deep Transition. These problems such as climate change (caused by the use of fossil fuels), 
pollution, enormous waste of resources (caused by the assumptions of limitless supply of resources 
and limitless capacity to absorb waste), inequality (caused by system innovation mainly aimed at 
the richer markets) and persistent unemployment (caused by a relentless emphasis on productivity 
growth) are enabled, generated and sustained by a wide range of dominant socio-technical systems 
for the provision of energy, mobility, communication, housing, clothing, water, healthcare, materials 
and food put in place during the First Deep Transition and they cannot be overcome by optimizing 
current systems. Failures to solve these problems, in turn, will generate more and more political 
unrest and, if not addressed, increase the potential for social conflict (Østby, 2008; Dixon, 2009; 
Mildner et al., 2011; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012). 
 
We thus define Deep Transition as a series of connected individual transitions in a wide range of 
socio-technical systems. The transition is called deep for three reasons: first, it involves changing a 
set of deeply embedded meta-rules shared among several socio-technical systems; at present this 
refers to ones created during the First Deep Transition to industrial modernity. These rules are 
deeply implicated in the enduring problems generated by the emergence of the industrial modernity. 
Second, the magnitude of social and technical changes required for a Deep Transition implies that 
its unfolding entails entering a new phase in the history of industrialization, industrial capitalism 
and perhaps even modernity as a whole. And third, historical experience of the First Deep 
Transition suggests that the whole shift might take more than a century to unfold in full. In this 
paper we therefore explore the following broad research question: how can we understand the 
emergence, acceleration, stabilization and directionality of Deep Transitions? 
 
To answer this question we develop a new conceptual framework able to account for major ruptures 
as well as underlying continuities in the evolution of socio-technical systems over the past two 
centuries. We begin from the exploration of two influential frameworks focused on the explanation 
of major long-term socio-technical shifts: Techno-economic Paradigms (TEP) and the Multi-level 
Perspective (MLP) (section 2). In sections 3 and 4 we work towards a synthesis of these 
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approaches. This, in turn, leads to the outline of two possible developmental trajectories of the 
Second Deep Transition, outlined in the final section. 
 
A few disclaimers should be made before proceeding. We clearly want to stress our non-teleological 
and non-determinist credentials: neither the First nor the Second Deep Transition were or are bound 
to progress towards a pre-defined end-state. Our only claim is that such a transition will have to 
address the persistent problems generated by the First Deep Transition: however, this can happen in 
different ways. There is thus no guarantee that current developments would necessarily lead to the 
reduction of inequality or addressing climate change in a way many would recognize as sustainable 
development. And the 'logic' of existing socio-technical systems, however this term may be defined, 
most certainly does not 'force' a unilinear path to the future. We are simply claiming that Deep 
Transitions cannot be reduced to social drivers abstracted from their material context: the ongoing 
interactions between the material and the social are a defining feature of Deep Transitions. 
Moreover, Deep Transitions have been and will be fundamentally shaped by human agency (see 
Stirling 2008, 2009, for the notion of directionality and importance of politics of transition), albeit 
an agency exercised within important socio-material constraints. 
 
Finally, we hasten to point out the tentative nature of the ideas presented here. Rather than a full-
fledged theory the following account should be read as an extended adventurous hypothesis. This 
implies that we hold many elements of our framework, including its foundational assumptions, open 
to criticism, modification and further testing. We therefore end the paper with the contours of a 
research program that would need to be addressed if a satisfactory answer to our two main research 
questions is to be given. 
 
2. Theorizing Deep Transitions 
 
The notion of Deep Transitions developed here entails a focus on large-scale and long-term socio-
technical systems change. Existing literature on the topic can be thought of as a story being told on 
three different levels of aggregation: 
1. First is the analysis of how socio-technical systems emerge, grow, mature, decline and how 
shifts from one system to another take place. In this story the evolution of an individual 
system (e.g. factory production, urban passenger transport) takes a prominent place although 
what happens in the system's environment can decisively shape its further development. 
Large Technical Systems (Hughes, 1983; Nye 1998) and the Multi-level Perspective on 
socio-technical transitions (Geels, 2005; Grin et al, 2010) would be examples of such 
approaches. 
2. Second is the analysis of multiple socio-technical systems that emerge, grow, interact, 
mature and decline constituting regular long term historical patterns. In this story the focus 
is on a set of interrelated systems that, however, might also be shaped by the broader 
environment in which these systems reside. The Control Revolution thesis (Beniger, 1986), 
Eras of Technology concept (Misa, 2004) and the Techno-economic Paradigm framework 
(Freeman and Louça, 2001; Perez, 2002) would be examples of such approaches.  
3. Third is the analysis which seeks to identify the general characteristics of industrial 
modernity to argue that developments in recent decades testify to a decisive break away 
from it. This story then speaks about industrialization as a general trend, albeit one that may 
interact with other ones (e.g. the capitalism, individualization, secularization etc.). Giddens's 
work on modernity and self-identity (1991), the risk society thesis (Beck, 1992) or the 
network society framework (Castells, 2000-2004) would be examples of such approaches. 
 
Each of these stories has their advantages and disadvantages, enabling to capture some aspects of 
socio-technical systems change while overlooking others. What is missing from current literature, 
however, is how these three stories relate to each other. We lack an explanation how the interaction 
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of individual socio-technical systems has time and again led to the emergence of tightly connected 
synergistic clusters (e.g. the coming together of microprocessors, computers, network technology 
and media content provision during the last decades) that increasingly constitute the socio-material 
fabric of our everyday lives. Nor do we have a framework for explaining how path-dependencies 
between such clusters are built up and sustained over centuries so that it becomes meaningful to talk 
about industrial modernity as a single phenomenon in the first place. The Deep Transition 
framework will address these two gaps by attempting to establish explicit connections between the 
three literatures. 
 
What might this synthesis achieve that existing accounts on long-term change have not? Here one 
could highlight the fact that long-term change of the past two centuries has often been told as one of 
sustained economic growth (Vries, 2013), development of political systems and institutions 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), political and military competition (Hoffman, 2015) or the 
emergence of new values, ideologies and ways of looking at the world (Mokyr, 2012). What is 
distinctive about our approach is its emphasis on the endogenous and co-evolutionary interactions 
between complexes of socio-technical systems in shaping long-term continuities and the 
directionality of industrial modernity at large. Such a socio-material focus distinguishes the 
proposal from economic, political and sociological institutionalist literatures that often tend to treat 
technological change as an exogenous factor enabling institutional change (Kingston and Caballero, 
2009; Brousseau et al., 2011; Jones et al, 2013; but see Nelson, 2005, for an exception). On the 
other hand, it also makes the approach distinctive from various approaches aiming to uncover 
implicit structures or macro-processes guiding the behaviour of actors (e.g. Lévi-Strauss, 1963; 
Wallerstein, 1974-2011) as these tend to focus overly on social structures abstracted from their 
material context, largely downplaying the causal significance of technologies as a result.  
 
The novelty of the approach also means that it is difficult to simply borrow an existing framework 
and to apply it straightforwardly: what is needed is a synthesis of existing insights, concepts, and 
theories. As a starting point we have an explicit preference for theories that satisfy – or which in our 
opinion show strong potential to be developed further in order to satisfy – criteria in the following 
six dimensions: 
1. Level of abstraction: we aim at a middle-range theory of Deep Transitions, that is, a theory 
combining a limited number of interrelated concepts for making explicit and (potentially 
testable) context-dependent propositions about a specific phenomenon. We are not interested 
in proposing an overarching meta-theoretical framework which, owing to its highly abstract 
nature, would be relatively immune to empirical revision. The analytical vocabulary of the 
selected theories should be able to contribute to the middle-range goal. 
2. Levels of aggregation: the Deep Transitions framework is about creating connections 
between developments in individual socio-technical systems, interconnected systems and 
broader industrialization-related macro-trends. Correspondingly, the choice of literature 
should reflect this by incorporating insights from all levels. 
3. Arrows of causality: the mutual shaping of social and material factors should be an integral 
part of the theory. Neither of them should be prioritized, either ontologically or 
methodologically, e.g. by reducing the explanation of Deep Transitions to 'social drivers' or 
'technological determinants'. Selected theories should therefore be compatible with this 
premise. 
4. Historical evolution: the aim of the theory should be to detect the patterns and mechanisms 
of Deep Transitions. We want to go further than simply coining a new concept and 
identifying its supposedly time-independent characteristics: the idea should be to theorize 
the emergence, acceleration, stabilization as well as the directionality of Deep Transitions. 
This also means that the selected theories should be able to account for processes operating 
over a long term time-scale, more than several decades. 
5. Geographical scale: the theory should also be able to explain how and why socio-technical 
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systems change happens at different spatial locations, how linkages between these locations 
are created and how this process generates global impacts. The analytical vocabulary of the 
selected theories should enable to develop multi-scalar explanations. 
6. Agency: the focus on big historical patterns always creates a danger that the choices made 
by different actors disappear from view. This is something we would like to avoid. Hence 
the theories we work with should also be able to integrate the agency of historical actors, 
especially the power struggles between different social groups that create long-term 
outcomes and path-dependencies. 
 
Admittedly, taken together this amounts to a rather restrictive set of conditions few existing 
approaches can even approximate. We think that of the theories dealing with socio-technical 
systems change there are at least two suitable candidates we want to bring together: the Techno-
economic Paradigm (TEP) framework and the Multi-level Perspective (MLP) on socio-technical 
transitions. Both are middle-range theories focused on the explanation of long-term patterns of 
socio-technical change which includes the mutual shaping of actors, technologies and institutions. 
In the following we provide an overview of their main tenets and shortcomings in order to build a 
first conceptualization of a Deep Transition. We will then use various literatures from Science, 
Technology and Innovation Studies, history of technology, macro-history and macro-sociology to 
relate the synthesis of the two approaches (section 3) to even wider trends (section 4). 
 
2.1 Techno-economic paradigm framework 
 
The Techno-economic Paradigms framework (Freeman and Perez, 1988; Tylecote, 1992; Podobnik, 
1999; Freeman and Louça, 2001; Dewick et al., 2004; Drechsler et. al, 2009; Mathews, 2013, 
2014), especially as developed by Carlota Perez (2002, 2010, 2011, 2013), focuses on explaining 
the 'long waves' or the 'Great Surges of Development': successive waves of technological, 
organizational and institutional rearrangements that historically have resulted in major increases in 
productivity and product quality, structural changes in production and consumption, and long-term 
economic growth (Perez, 2002). Each surge evolves from small beginnings in certain sectors and/or 
regional areas and ends up encompassing the entire economies and societies of leading countries, 
gradually diffusing to other countries as well. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, 
there have been five such surges, each lasting about 40-60 years2. 
 
Each surge has consisted of an important all-pervasive low-cost input, often a source of energy (e.g. 
coal or oil) or a new material (e.g. plastics), new technologies, products and processes, and new or 
fundamentally redefined infrastructures (Perez, 2010). Yet the transformative power of the surge is 
not located in the mere presence and interconnectedness of these elements. The transformation only 
takes off once they are combined with an appropriate techno-economic paradigm, i.e. 
“…a best practice model made up of a set of all pervasive generic technological and 
organizational principles, which represents the most effective way of applying a particular 
technological revolution and using it for modernizing and rejuvenating the whole of the 
economy. When generally adopted, these principles become the common-sense basis for 
organizing any activity and for structuring any institution.” (Perez, 2002: 17) 
                                                 
2
  It should be noted that the 'long wave' debate is far from settled with some continuing to contest the existence of 
these waves in the first place (see Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010; Metz, 2011, for recent contrasting viewpoints). It is 
unclear though whether this refers to deficiencies in the theory itself or to measurement difficulties (Bernard et al., 
2014). We therefore prefer to follow Perez's more qualitatively oriented framework that aims to find patterns in the 
evolution of five clusters of radical innovations. This approach relaxes the more stringent but also in our view 
unnecessarily restrictive assumptions underlying the long wave approach: narrow focus on the economic domain, a 
simplistic belief in the global simultaneity of the waves and search for waves in aggregate variables such as GDP 
(Perez, 2002: 60). However, in this context it is worth mentioning that a recent analysis of patent grants (Korotayev 
et al., 2011) detected a considerably clearer wave-like pattern on a global than on a national (USA) level. 
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In other words, techno-economic paradigms provide a 'meta-routine' for the application of new 
technologies in a number of industries old and new. Acting as coordinating mechanisms these meta-
routines generate interconnections between technologies and industries (Perez, 2011: 14). Table 1 
provides a descriptive overview of the main characteristics of all five surges. 
 
The dynamics of techno-economic paradigms stem from two sources: first, the saturation of specific 
technological opportunities within the framework of an existing paradigm. In other words, over 
time the combination of technological revolutions underlying each wave and their best practices of 
application run into diminishing returns. The second results from the difference in ease with which 
the owners of production and finance capital are able to reorient themselves. Whereas the former 
are tied to the existing equipment, buildings, knowledge, experience, organization, personnel, 
external networks of suppliers, distributors and clients, the latter are more flexible and mobile. Thus 
when the existing surge runs into problems the owners of financial capital are able relocate their 
investments quicker. The owners of production and financial capital are thus the principal actors in 
Perez's model (2002). The recurrent criticism that the the “long wave” approach is overly 
deterministic and lacking agency (Köhler, 2012; Lachman, 2013) thus does not apply to the 
perezian version making it a promising building block for the theory of Deep Transitions. 
 
Perez (2002, 2011) divides the evolution of the surges in two periods separated by a turning point: 
installation period (further divided in irruption and frenzy phases) and deployment (further divided 
in synergy and maturity phases) (see figure 1). The emergence of each new paradigm overlaps with 
the decline of the dominant one. In the irruption phase, the old surge starts to exhaust itself which is 
reflected in declining productivity, increasing unemployment and constricted growth of markets. 
This prompts the owners of financial capital to find various solutions to this problem: as a result 
they start to create speculative schemes, invest in new markets and lower cost production sites, but 
also in new technologies and industries. Early risk-taking investors gain high yields from initial 
investments leading to generalized but unrealistic profit expectations. In the frenzy phase that 
follows, massive amounts of capital are directed to emergent industries unable to absorb them. On 
one hand, these investments enable the creation of new technologies, infrastructures and best 
practices; on the other hand, they also lead to a speculative bubble and an increasing polarization of 
rich and poor (Fusari and Reati, 2013). When finally this bubble bursts, a turning point, 
characterized by serious recession, is reached. This, in turn, generates support for state action and 
regulatory changes which would create a better institutional environment for the new paradigm 
while avoiding the excesses of financial speculation. When this happens, the paradigm enters the 
synergy phase, a golden age, where production capital with long-term expansion strategies takes the 
lead. What follows is a period of widespread economic growth and decreasing social inequality. 
During this period, the paradigm acts as a selection mechanism, favouring certain technologies 
compatible with its logic and rejecting others. In the maturity phase, the potential of the paradigm 
gradually becomes exhausted creating incentives for financial capital to start looking for more 
profitable investment opportunities and thereby leading the cycle to repeat itself. 
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Table 1. Five Great Surges of Development (Perez 2010: 190, 192-193, 196-197). 
 
Technological 
revolution 
Core country or 
countries 
New technologies and new or 
redefined industries 
New or redefined infrastructures Techno-economic paradigm, 'common-
sense' innovation principles 
The Industrial 
Revolution (1771-1828) 
Britain Mechanised cotton industry 
Wrought iron 
Machinery 
Canals and waterways 
Turnpike roads 
Water power (highly improved 
water wheels) 
Factory production 
Mechanisation 
Productivity: time keeping and time 
saving 
Fluidity of movement (as ideal for 
machines with water-power and for 
transport through canals and other 
waterways) 
Local networks 
Age of Steam and 
Railways (1829-1874) 
Britain (spreading 
to Europe and USA) 
Steam engines and machinery 
(made in iron, fuelled by coal) 
Iron and coal mining (now playing 
central role in growth) 
Railway construction 
Rolling stock production 
Steam power for many industries 
(including textiles) 
Railways (use of steam engine) 
Universal postal service 
Telegraph (mainly nationally along 
railway lines) 
Great ports, great depots and 
worldwide sailing ships 
City gas 
Economies of agglomeration 
Industrial cities 
National markets 
Power centres with national networks 
Scale as progress 
Standard parts: machine-made machines 
Energy where needed (steam) 
Interdependent movement (of machines 
and of means of transport) 
Age of Steel, Electricity 
and Heavy Engineering 
(1875-1907) 
USA and Germany 
forging ahead and 
overtaking Britain 
Cheap steel (especially Bessemer) 
Full development of steam engine 
for steel ships 
Heavy chemistry and civil 
engineering 
Electrical equipment industry 
Copper and cables 
Canned and bottled food 
Paper and packaging 
Worldwide shipping in rapid steel 
steamships (use of Suez canal) 
Transcontinental railways (use of 
cheap steel rails and bolts in 
standard sizes) 
Great bridges and tunnels 
Worldwide telegraph 
Telephone (mainly nationally) 
Electrical networks (for 
illumination and industrial use) 
Giant structures (steel) 
Economies of scale of plant: vertical 
integration 
Distributed power for industry (electricity) 
Science as a productive force 
Worldwide networks and empires 
(including cartels) 
Universal standardisation 
Cost accounting for control and efficiency 
Great scale for world market power: 
‘small' is successful, if local 
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Age of Oil, the 
Automobile and Mass 
Production (1908-1970) 
USA (with 
Germany as vying 
for world 
leadership), later 
spreading to 
Europe 
Mass-produced automobiles 
Cheap oil and oil fuels 
Petrochemicals (synthetics) 
Internal combustion engine for 
automobiles, transport, tractors, 
aeroplanes, war tanks and 
electricity 
Home electrical appliances 
Refrigerated and frozen foods 
Networks of roads, highways, 
ports and airports 
Networks of oil ducts 
Universal electricity (industry and 
homes) 
Worldwide analogue 
telecommunications (telephone, 
telex and cablegram), wire and 
wireless 
Mass production/mass markets 
Economies of scale (product and market 
volume): horizontal integration 
Standardisation of products 
Energy intensity (oil-based) 
Synthetic materials 
Functional specialisation: hierarchical 
pyramids 
Centralisation: metropolitan centres-
suburbanisation 
National powers, world agreements and 
confrontations 
Age of Information and 
Telecommunications 
(1971-...) 
USA (spreading to 
Europe and Asia) 
The information revolution 
Cheap microelectronics 
Computers, software 
Telecommunications 
Control instruments 
Computer-aided biotechnology and 
new materials 
World digital telecommunications 
(cable, fibre, optics, radio and 
satellite 
Internet/electronic mail and other 
e-services 
Multiple source, flexible use, 
electricity networks 
High-speed multi-modal physical 
transport links (by land, air and 
water) 
Information-intensity (microelectronics-
based ICT) 
Decentralised integration: network 
structures 
Knowledge as capital: intangible value 
added 
Heterogeneity, diversity, adaptability 
Segmentation of markets: proliferation of 
niches 
Economies of scope and specialisation 
combined with scale 
Globalisation: interaction between the 
global and the local 
Inward and outward cooperation: clusters 
Instant contact and action: instant global 
communications 
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Figure 1. The dynamics of a Great Surge of Development (based on Perez, 2002: 30). 
 
 
Perez (2013) contends that we are now at the turning point of the fifth surge, which will get its full 
deployment when information and communication technologies are combined with green growth. 
She argues that the fifth TEP, enabled by the ICT Revolution, can take the economy in many 
different directions but only if active institutional innovation creates synergies can the surge 
succeed in bringing another period of stable long-term growth. In her view, this has historically 
been achieved by government policy. Tilting the playing field to enable and to encourage massive 
green innovation radically transforming production patterns and lifestyles on a global scale could do 
for the world population what the post-war boom did for the West. It would imply a major overhaul 
of many products and production methods, a redesign of consumption patterns to stress quality, 
durability, low-energy consumption, low or no emissions, recyclability and upgradeability. Waste 
management would be handled as a wealth creating process and growth would be decoupled from 
use of resources. 
 
Although Perez is relaxed about the exact timing of the phases the current surge seems to deviate 
considerably from the established pattern. If we take 1971 as the starting point of the fifth surge and 
60 years as its maximum expected length then the turning point should have been reached about 15 
years ago. The dotcom-boom that occurred around the 2000s would indeed fit this pattern. Since 
then we should have been enjoying the benefits of the golden age, expecting the maturity phase to 
begin any time soon. What happened instead, of course, were the global financial crisis and a 
continued increase in social inequality in various developed countries (Piketty, 2014). USA, one of 
the leading countries of the surge, has experienced a further decline in labour's share of national 
income (Kristal, 2013) and a polarization of the labour market with jobs in the middle range of the 
skill distribution being squeezed out (Autor and Dorn, 2013). 
 
There are various explanations to why this might be the case. Perez herself (2013) suggests that the 
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full deployment of the wealth-creating potential of the ICT revolution requires the establishment of 
adequate socio-institutional frameworks and regulatory frameworks on national as well as 
international level. According to her argument this has been missing until now because politicians 
and policy-makers, blinded by the strong neoliberal ideology, have avoided confronting the task of 
structural reform. In her view turning points could last for years and more than a decade if there is 
not a major tilting of the playing field by the government (this is what happened during the 1930s 
when governments refused to manage the economic crisis and for a long time failed to recognize the 
danger of totalitarian systems). Turning points might also have several bubbles: we have had two 
during the fifth surge and might be heading towards another one unless governments decide to take 
adequate action (Perez, 2009). The discussion why this turning point seems to linger on leads us to 
the question whether instead of moving to a deployment phase of the fifth surge, we might be 
already moving towards the next one. 
 
This is what Mathews (2011, 2013) has suggested. He argues that the fifth surge may already be 
running its course, and hence we may already be experiencing the installation period of  
the sixth one. This surge is led by China with India, Brazil and Germany also playing an important 
role. It is characterized by the following features: 
 “A shift to renewables as the dominant energy paradigm. 
 Decentralized generation of power, from multiple energy sources. 
 Competitive international trade in renewable electric power. 
 Reduced energy intensity and enhanced efficiency (e.g. through operations of energy 
services companies). 
 Intelligent (smart) IT-enabled grids for distribution of renewable electric power, 
giving resilience to power networks. 
 Biomimetic organizational and industrial design principles (e.g. linked heat and 
power). 
 Circulation of resources and resource efficiency: circular economy. 
 Eco-targeted finance.” (Mathews, 2013: 17) 
 
Mathews (2014: 106, 158-160) shows that major investments in renewable energy technologies like 
solar photovoltaic and wind power generation have already occurred resulting in the reduction of 
production costs, decrease in price and increase in diffusion. However, questions remain about the 
extent to which it is possible to further scale up the manufacturing and the deployment of these 
technologies, how to overcome the inertia and political influence of fossil fuel interests, and how to 
develop appropriate financial instruments to enable institutional investors from pension funds and 
insurance companies to invest more in renewable and other clean technologies (ibid.). Perez would 
predict that this first irruption phase should bring huge profits to early investors which will then 
lead to an investment boom. Hence we would soon expect the investments in renewable energies to 
develop into a speculative financial bubble. Although investment in renewable technologies is 
clearly growing all over the world and very rapidly in some regions (see figure 2), the trend does 
not have the characteristics of a bubble yet. Are we thus really experiencing a sixth surge? 
 
Perez (2013) would argue that investment in renewable energy does not represent a new surge. 
What we see is renewable development driven by ICT deployment (e.g. smart grids) necessary to 
make them profitable (Mazzucato and Perez, 2014). As her theory predicts it is at the turning point 
that the State begins to take action. This is corroborated by the fact that in leading countries of the 
current surge politicians and policy-makers have realized that the greening of capitalism is 
necessary to address the challenges of climate change, including massive reductions in waste and 
pollution production, and have therefore begun to promote it actively (see Mathews and Tan, 2015, 
for a detailed analysis of China). 
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Figure 2. Global new investment in renewable energy by region, 2004-2015 ($BN) (Frankfurt School-UNEP 
Centre/BNEF, 2016: 22). 
 
 
 
We suggest that the problematic dating of the fifth surge may imply that it has a markedly different 
character than the earlier ones, and in fact may represent a transitory period bridging two Deep 
Transitions. In other words, the turning point of the current surge might simultaneously turn out to 
be the beginning of a new sequence of Great Surges of Development, the Second Deep Transition. 
Formulated this way, the TEP framework helps us to conceptualize the historical unfolding of Deep 
Transitions in various ways. It identifies a recurrent evolutionary pattern during which new 
technological revolutions and associated best practices emerge, become connected and obtain a 
specific direction of development in a large number of sectors and areas. Hence TEPs can be seen 
as the generators of Deep Transitions. They provide both the connections between various socio-
technical systems as well as a shared directionality of their development over time. The TEP 
framework also provides an explanation of the cycle of rise and fall of successive Great Surges of 
Development. We argue that whereas each surge contributed to the First Deep Transition, it is the 
five surges taken together that constitute it. 
 
Although the TEP framework provides an innovative conceptualization of the source of 
interconnections between socio-technical systems and a build-up of their directionality, its account 
of the dynamics of socio-technical change remains partial. To begin with, while it pays much 
attention to the actions of the owners of financial and production capital the role of many other 
social groups is almost completely neglected. For example, TEP does not recognize the active role 
of consumers and civil-society actors in contributing to the emergence, acceleration and 
stabilization of surges. Second, although TEP acknowledges the contested nature of new paradigms 
in which the government plays a central role (e.g. Freeman and Louçã, 2001: 157; Perez, 2011: 27), 
the politics of all of this are neither explored nor theorized in much detail. 
 
Third, the TEP framework is driven by internal dynamics; the current description seems to have no 
place for exogenous events such as wars. Perez explicitly argues (2002: 160) that while WWI and 
WWII accounted for specific features of economic development, they neither influenced the nature 
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of TEPs nor the overall dynamics of their development. They can however accelerate, divert or 
shape the way a TEP is applied (Perez, personal communication, April 2016). Historical evidence, 
on the other hand, suggests that wars have had a fundamental impact on the directionality of 
individual socio-technical systems. For example, one could highlight the effect of WWI on the 
consolidation of the British electricity system (Hughes, 1983) or on tilting the scales decisively 
towards the gasoline car in the USA (Mom, 2004). It is hard to see then why the same should not 
hold for interconnected socio-technical systems and associated meta-routines. In fact, Schot and Rip 
(2010: 27) have argued that the WWII was a decisive turning point in the Dutch and, in fact, the 
European debate on how to modernize, helping to establish the dominance of the idea of 
modernization through scale increase, mass production and mass consumption. Hence we think that 
the impact of macro-events on TEP development warrants closer attention. However, it must be 
noted that the category of macro-events does not only include rapid shocks such as wars but also 
more gradual changes and trends such as climate change, urbanization and globalization. 
 
Fourth, TEP's depiction of paradigm shift follows a substitution pattern: the new paradigm replaces 
the old one. However, this view omits the existence of a variety of technological, organizational and 
institutional innovations in specific niches of application. In other words, the decline of one TEP 
might be accompanied by the simultaneous emergence of not only one but many potentially 
competing embryonic paradigms. Moreover, historians of technology have shown that old 
technologies and practices do not disappear: on the contrary they remain vitally important, often 
continue to persist in specific niches of application, compete against newer technologies, and, in 
certain conditions, might become popular again (Edgerton, 2007). The area of transport provides 
several examples: the electric vehicle, bicycle and public transportation have time and again 
resurfaced (and disappeared) as alternatives for the gasoline car (Mom, 2004; Geels et al., 2012; 
Longhurst, 2015). A similar dynamic might be at play at the level of TEPs where old technologies 
and practices continue to exist in parallel with the dominant ones, e.g. the continuation of small 
shop production in certain sectors and regions even during the heydays of the Fordist mass 
production regime (Jessop, 1992; Scranton, 1997). 
 
The dynamics between dominant socio-technical systems and niche innovations are at the core of 
the Multi-level Perspective on socio-technical transitions. It is to this approach that we now turn. 
 
2.2 The Multi-level Perspective 
 
The Multi-level Perspective (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2005a; Grin et al., 2010) focuses on 
explaining large scale and long-term shifts – often 50 years or more – from one socio-technical 
system to another. Examples of transitions include shifts from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles 
(Geels, 2005b), from manual to mechanized transshipment in harbors (van Driel and Schot, 2005), 
from mixed farming to intensive pig husbandry (Geels, 2009), and from fossil fuel based energy 
system to one based on renewables (Verbong and Geels, 2007). 
 
The basic components making up the multi-level framework are niches, socio-technical regimes and 
landscape. Socio-technical regimes can be defined as shared, stable and aligned sets of rules or 
routines directing the behaviour of actors on how to produce, regulate and use transportation, 
communication, food, and energy technologies. These rules are embedded in the various elements 
of the socio-technical system and they shape innovative activities towards a specific trajectory of 
incremental innovation (e.g. increased processing speed in computers or increased fuel efficiency 
for cars). Figure 3 provides an example of a socio-technical system for land-based transportation. 
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Figure 3. Socio-technical system for mobility (adapted from Geels 2005b: 446). 
 
 
New socio-technical regimes are developed in spaces called niches. These are application areas 
dominated by specific selection criteria which shield the emerging new and unstable technologies 
from direct market pressure. Compared to dominant regimes the actors in niches are few, their 
interrelations sparse, the focal technology immature and the guiding rules in constant flux. Niche 
technologies can then be seen as 'hopeful monstrosities' (Mokyr, 1990): promising in potential, 
meagre in performance. For this reason niche technologies often need to be protected from 
pressures exerted by the incumbent socio-technical regimes until they have become mature enough 
to enter the market. 
 
The concept of landscape refers to the exogenous environment shaping both niches and regimes. 
Landscape pressures involve trends such as globalization, urbanization and climate change, but also 
events such as wars, natural disasters, and economic crises. This varied set of factors can be 
combined in a single 'landscape' category, because they form an external context that niche and 
regime actors cannot influence – at least in the short run. 
 
The most important novel insight of MLP is that a transition of a socio-technical system results 
from the interaction of events on all three levels. A transition typically proceeds in three phases. In 
the first, start-up phase, landscape pressure exacerbates the internal problems of the regime creating 
a window of opportunity for niche technologies. For example, in the second half of the 19th century 
increasing urbanization intensified the problems with horse-drawn carriage regime, including the 
high cost and low speed of horses or the amount of manure in the streets, facilitating the emergence 
of niche technologies such as bicycles, trams and automobiles (McShane, 1994; Geels, 2005b). In 
the second, acceleration phase, niches expand, attract more users, and become mainstream markets 
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starting to compete with the incumbent regime and other niches for dominance. As new 
technologies diffuse the accompanying rule-sets are redefined. In the case of urban transport 
transition horse-drawn carriages, bicycles, electric trams, stream trams, electric cars, steam cars and 
gasoline cars all came to compete against each other for decades until the automobile regime finally 
established itself as a dominant one (ibid.). In the third, stabilization phase, the number of actors is 
high, the technology itself mature and the guiding rules relatively stable meaning that the former 
niche has established itself as a new regime. This allows for a sharp increase in adoption as the 
regime now provides a ready-made 'template' for largely routinized user behaviour. For example, 
the dominant practices of car use in the USA had been defined by interwar users whereas the post-
war adoption, while much extensive in terms of the number of adopters, was largely based on 
imitative learning (Kanger and Schot, forthcoming). 
 
One of the key findings of MLP is that transitions can occur through various pathways, depending 
on the intensity of landscape pressure, the resilience of the dominant regime and the maturity of the 
niches (Geels and Schot, 2007, 2010). For example, if landscape pressure is relatively intense 
whereas the niche technologies have not matured enough intense competition between various 
solutions follows – this is what happened in the case of US urban transport transition. However, if 
niche technologies are mature a relatively quick technological substitution might follow as 
evidenced in the shift from sailing ships to steamers (Geels, 2002; see figure 4). Conversely, the 
lack of sufficient landscape pressure or a high degree of regime resilience may result in no 
transition or a failed transition (Geels and Schot, 2007, 2010; Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2012). The 
MLP thus provides a nuanced analytical vocabulary for explaining not only whether transitions 
occur but how they do so in individual socio-technical systems. 
 
The early version of MLP was criticized for downplaying agency, for turning insufficient attention 
to the contested nature of transitions and a failure to capture the influence of specific social groups 
such as users and cities in shaping transitions (Meadowcroft, 2005; Smith et al., 2005; Smith and 
Stirling, 2007; Genus and Coles, 2008; Hodson and Marvin, 2010). These issues were taken up in 
subsequent studies (van Driel and Schot, 2005; Geels, 2006; Elzen et al., 2011; Baker et al., 2014). 
The resulting additions to MLP have made it clear that the process of transition is far from a 
moderate and rational consensus-oriented debate about best solutions to clearly defined problems: 
instead it is rife with struggles between regime-actors and niche-actors with conflicting interests, 
differing time-scales, problem definitions and perceived best courses of action. 
 
We argue that there are various ways in which MLP's vocabulary can complement the TEP 
framework as outlined in the previous section. First, the MLP framework includes a richer selection 
of actors: niches and regimes are shaped not only by the owners of financial and production capital 
but also by scientists, engineers, policy-makers, users, media, and social movements and so on. 
Second, MLP not only recognizes the contestation and conflict involved in regime shift but has also 
made some preliminary steps to theorize the process (see Geels, 2014; Penna and Geels, 2012; 
2015) – although whether these insights can be transferred to research on paradigm shifts remains 
an open issue. Third, although MLP has been criticized for treating landscape as a residual category 
(Markard and Truffer, 2008; see a response in Geels, 2011) then compared to TEP it provides some 
analytical vocabulary for conceptualizing the impact of macro-trends and events on the evolution of 
individual socio-technical systems. And fourth, MLP remains much more sensitive to the issue of 
variety as preserved in niches. Therefore, in contrast to TEP which assumes a more straightforward 
process of paradigm substitution, MLP would look for the appearance/disappearance of and 
competition between the variety of possible paradigms during each shift. 
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Figure 4. Multi-level Perspective on socio-technical transitions: technological substitution pathway (Geels and 
Schot, 2007: 401). 
 
 
However, when it comes to its applicability for the study of Deep Transitions MLP continues to 
suffer from two important shortcomings. First, a large majority of MLP has focused on transitions 
involving individual socio-technical systems. In comparison, only a few studies have explicitly 
explored interactions between multiple regimes. Geels (2007) found that the changing relations 
between radio and recording regimes – from competitive to symbiotic – contributed to the rise of a 
music style which can be interpreted as a new combined regime (rock and roll). Raven and Verbong 
(2009) added two other types of interaction, integration and spill-over. Papachristos et al. (2013) 
argued that multi-regime interactions (disruptive or reinforcing) might influence the niche 
formation process through enabling niche transfer, interference or the emergence of a new niche. 
While all these focused on the possible outcomes of multi-regime interaction Konrad et al. (2008) 
identified two ways in which these connections are established: functional and structural couplings. 
The former refer to input-output relationships such as supplier-buyer relationships or global value 
chains. Structural couplings refer to shared use of infrastructures, actors and rules: for example, 
telecommunication firms using electricity cables of utilities or both types of companies using the 
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same R&D organization. These findings imply that it is through these couplings that ad-hoc multi-
regime dynamics become gradually consolidated and eventually stabilized. However, in our final 
assessment MLP currently does not offer detailed understanding of how the creation of these 
couplings between different regimes adds up to meta-regimes or new techno-economic paradigms. 
 
The second weakness is shared by MLP and TEP. Namely, at the heart of both approaches is a 
concern with temporal developments, while the spatial scale of transitions and surges is not 
explicitly conceptualized. In MLP analyses the three levels are often implicitly conflated with 
specific territorial boundaries: regimes tend to be studied on the national level, niches on the local 
or regional level and landscape on the international or global level. The TEP framework, in turn, 
assumes that paradigms emerge in national contexts, in particular in leading countries. This focus 
on the national is not inherent to the frameworks, however. The elements of surges can emerge in 
several countries simultaneously and circulate between multiple locations. Similarly in MLP each 
level could have a variety of spatial positionings. That is, niches can exist across national borders 
and regimes can operate in local, national and international spaces. Geographers have made a 
number of contributions to develop the spatial dimension of MLP further, in particular, by pointing 
at the importance of exploring the specificities of spaces in which niches, regimes and landscape 
operate and the need to explore how these spaces link up across local and national borders (Coenen 
et al., 2012; Raven et al., 2012; Hansen and Coenen, 2015; Truffer et al., 2015). This approach 
opens up various interesting research possibilities: for example, how global landscape trends or 
emerging techno-economic paradigms are 'filtered' through particular national constituencies 
leading to different 'varieties of paradigms' in particular countries. However, as the exploration of 
the spatial dimensions of MLP is a relatively recent development these observations currently tend 
to have a sensitizing value and their true explanatory potential remains to be tapped. 
 
We have already introduced the notion of structural and functional coupling as a possible way of 
establishing links between regimes, usually in particular spatial locations (e.g. the nation state). Yet 
there has been little mention about the actors involved in this process. Here we would highlight the 
role of international and transnational organizations which are responsible for developing standards, 
facilitating mutual learning and providing training and development (Kaiser and Schot, 2014). By 
aggregating the lessons learned in different countries and acting as international intermediaries 
these organizations can become dedicated TEP builders. As such they constitute an important 
transfer mechanism between states and nationally bounded organizations as well as an arena for 
discussing and negotiating the directionality of transitions. The study of these international and 
transnational actors can thus help to explain how TEPs get their direction and develop a specific 
spatial reach. 
 
2.3 TEP and MLP: A comparison 
 
The foregoing sections have suggested that MLP and TEP provide complementary views on large-
scale and long-term socio-technical changes. Table 2 summarizes the similarities and differences 
between the two approaches. 
 
The table enables to make explicit the conceptual similarities between the basic vocabulary of MLP 
and TEP. Namely, techno-economic paradigms can be seen as connecting mechanisms between 
individual socio-technical regimes and between these regimes and the landscape. Being shared by 
multiple regimes a paradigm can thus be understood as a regime of regimes, that is, a meta-regime. 
This concept matches Perez's own notion of TEPs as meta-routines (2011: 14). 
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Table 2. TEP and MLP in comparison. 
 
 TEP MLP 
Unit of analysis Techno-economic paradigm (meta-
routines) 
Individual socio-technical regimes 
What is explained? Paradigm shift Shifts to new socio-technical systems 
In terms of what? Actions of the owners of financial and 
production capital, state intervention 
around the turning point 
Interaction between incumbent socio-
technical regimes, emerging niches (both 
including a wide range of different types of 
actors) and exogenous landscape pressures 
Conflict and 
contestation 
Conflict and contestation 
acknowledged (especially around the 
turning point) but not theorized in 
detail 
Emerging attempts to theorize the conflict 
and contestation of transitions 
Temporal scale 40-60 year long cycles 50+ year long transitions 
Exogenous events Not integral part of the framework Integral part of the framework 
Geographical scale 
and diffusion 
New paradigms gradually diffuse 
from the core towards more peripheral 
regions and countries 
Increasing sensitivity to the multi-scalar 
nature of transitions but 'methodological 
nationalism' still prevalent in actual 
research 
Replacement and 
sources of variety 
Simple substitution: new paradigm 
replaces the old one 
Continuous variety that emerges from and 
is sustained in niches before and after 
specific transitions 
 
Furthermore, one can immediately note a theoretical gap between TEP and MLP: on one hand, TEP 
does not have an explanation of how exactly different technological revolutions and emerging best 
practices interact in order to lead to the emergence and stabilization of new surges; on the other 
hand, MLP is also unable to explain how this happens in terms of multi-niche or multi-regime 
interactions. In effect, what is needed is the disaggregation of TEP and an aggregation of MLP. The 
following two sections undertake exactly this task to conceptualize the historical evolution of Deep 
Transitions. Although the affinities between TEP and MLP as well as their potential 
complementarities have been highlighted before (see Köhler, 2012, for an excellent overview) to 
date the next step remains to be taken. What we will therefore attempt is a synthesis of TEP and 
MLP to account for the emergence of meta-regimes, the shaping of the socio-technical landscape by 
multi-regime dynamics, and for the structuring effect of the evolving landscape and the meta-
regime on individual regimes and niches. Moreover, we will also turn attention to an additional 
aspect that MLP, focused as it is on single systems, and TEP both have neglected so far – the issue 
of between-surge continuities. It also means that we largely leave aside the issues of scale and 
power/conflict/contestation which will be treated in more detail in a separate paper. 
 
3. Towards a conceptual framework of Deep Transitions: combining TEP and MLP  
 
Since the following account borrows heavily from the analytical vocabulary of TEP and MLP some 
conceptual clarification is in order. Table 3 provides an overview of the concepts used below, 
including a brief formal definition, the place of these concepts in the framework and an empirical 
example. The rest of this section as well as the following one explore the interrelations between 
these concepts in more detail. 
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Table 3. Overview of basic concepts used in the framework. 
Concept Definition Place in the framework Example 
Niche Spaces for radical 
innovation that are 
protected by specific 
selection criteria 
Sustained sources of variety 
for innovations; seeds for 
regime-specific and cross-
regime rules 
Meat-packing industry 
niche as one of the 
precursors for mass 
production 
Regime Relatively stable and aligned 
sets of rules directing the 
behaviour of a set of actors 
along the trajectory of 
incremental innovation 
Multi-regime interactions 
lead to the emergence of 
meta-regimes. Dominant 
regimes also act as selection 
environments for niches 
Fordist mass production 
as defined in the 
automobile industry 
Socio-technical 
system 
Configuration of actors, 
technologies and institutions 
for fulfilling a certain 
societal function 
Manifestation of regimes 
which may differ depending 
on the specific characteristics 
of the environment (e.g. 
country-level differences) 
A system of individual 
passenger transport in 
the post-war USA 
Technological 
revolution 
Systems of systems: sets of 
interrelated radical 
breakthroughs, forming a 
major constellation of 
interdependent technologies 
(Perez, 2010: 189) 
Configurations of socio-
technical systems 
Microelectronics, 
computers, network 
infrastructure and the 
provision of new media 
content 
Techno-economic 
paradigm 
A set of best practices for the 
employment of 
technological revolutions 
Meta-regimes: rules shared 
by a range of regimes. 
Techno-economic paradigms 
also act as selection 
environments for niches and 
individual regimes 
The general logic of mass 
production as employed 
by various industries in 
the postwar era 
Great Surge of 
Development 
Combinations of 
technological revolutions 
and techno-economic 
paradigms, leading to major 
economic and societal 
impacts 
Building blocks for Deep 
Transitions 
The Age of Oil, the 
Automobile and Mass 
Production (Perez, 2010) 
Landscape Exogenous events and 
trends that shape niche-
regime dynamics 
Individual and interlinked 
socio-technical systems shape 
landscape dynamics and 
become gradually embedded 
to it. Landscape also 
functions as a selection 
environment for niches, 
regimes and meta-regimes 
The amplifying effect of 
mass production on 
individualization, leading 
to the abandoning of 
collective mobility and 
energy practices during 
the 20th century (Schot et 
al., 2010) 
Deep Transition Series of connected and 
sustained individual 
transitions in a wide range 
of socio-technical systems 
towards a similar direction 
Deep Transitions are 
manifested in continuities 
between different surges, 
they can be seen as general 
features of industrial 
modernity 
Continuous productivity 
and efficiency 
improvements offset by 
corresponding rises in 
demand 
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We begin with a proposition that the gestation and early installation period of a great surge of 
development is characterized by the parallel emergence of new technologies and associated regimes 
in several niches of individual socio-technical systems. As landscape pressures destabilize various 
dominant and established regimes multiple windows of opportunity are created for niches 
containing the promises of new regimes, and thus also embryonic paradigms-in-the-making. These 
regime destabilisation and niche formation processes are influenced by a host of actors, including 
firms, investors, governments, social movements and users. These processes also happen in various 
local contexts, at variable speed and with variable outcomes. However, experiments with new 
technologies are not restricted to the leading country. The success of the leading country can be 
more readily explained by its ability to learn from the experiments conducted in various locations, 
for example by participating in transnational and international platforms and organizations; to 
'borrow' the outcomes (e.g. new technologies, organizational innovations, institutional lessons) and 
to bring them together in a particular location. In any case, all these niches and emerging regimes 
provide a raw material, an essential variety from which the future TEP will be constructed. 
 
During the irruption phase the emerging and incumbent regimes come to compete against each 
other resulting in transitions (or transition failures) – outcomes that can be analysed in conventional 
MLP terms. Deep conflicts might develop between regime and niche actors, and also between 
actors promoting different niche-innovations. Through these transitions the future techno-economic 
paradigm starts to emerge. Its seeds might become dominant in certain individual systems in certain 
countries or regions, but not in others: for example, mass production techniques may be widely 
adopted in a chemical industry but not in the fashion industry or agricultural sector. The variety of 
different options means that at this point the outline of the emergent paradigm still cannot be 
sketched with any certainty. 
 
This in itself does not explain how certain paradigms become shared across systems though. We 
therefore propose that towards the end of the irruption and the beginning of the frenzy phase various 
potential paradigms start to diffuse through multi-regime dynamics. As the owners of financial 
capital direct investments to new technologies and industries, niche actors speed up the 
development of new technologies and associated best practices while regime actors begin to doubt 
whether the dominant systems have a bright future. Again it is important to stress the wide range of 
possible actors involved including firms, investors, users, social movements, civic groups, cities and 
various government agencies. Actors related to different expanding niches establish structural and 
functional couplings between multiple emergent regimes. This process can be further facilitated by 
the aggregation work of dedicated TEP builders. These actors, often inter- and transnational 
organizations, bring together experiences and ideas from different sectors, nurture mutual learning 
processes, help to establish networks between various stakeholders and shape expectations about 
the future of the niches. As such they build and empower the niches while hollowing out dominant 
regimes at the same time. In this way different paradigms-in-the-making diffuse to new socio-
technical systems (or are sometimes imposed on them as standards, for example through quality 
accreditation processes). As a result the connections between multiple regimes gradually start to 
become consolidated. However, at this point many possible paradigms still exist and hence it 
remains unclear which one would eventually prevail. 
 
This situation is finally resolved at the turning point. Until then there is still a variety of TEPs and 
hence many possible directions in which the new surge might unfold. However, the bursting of a 
speculative bubble around new technologies and nascent industries will incentivize the leading 
countries to create better regulatory conditions. Combined with the eruption of additional landscape 
pressures – either a rapid shock (such as war) or an accumulation of a longer trend reaching a 
critical threshold (such as climate change) – the perceptions of various actors become directed 
towards a similar direction. Therefore, from this point onwards one can start talking about the 
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existence of the dominant techno-economic paradigm advanced by leading countries and providing 
directionality across many socio-technical systems. Other countries then feel forced to play a catch-
up game. The alternative paradigms do not disappear entirely though: they may remain regime-
specific victories or revert to niche status, waiting to re-emerge at the next suitable opportunity. 
These niches represent alternative pathways advanced at specific locations, in specific sectors and 
by dedicated countries. This idea is supported by historical evidence showing that the principles of 
mechanization, use of science, economies of scale, mass production and mass consumption had to 
confront principles of batch production, use of tacit knowledge and craft based innovation, flexible 
specialization and appropriate technology during every surge (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 1985; Scranton, 1997; Schot and van Lente, 2010; Kaplinsky, 2011). 
 
In the synergy phase the dominant paradigm starts to exert its influence in three directions. In 
relation to niches it acts as a selection mechanism, favouring technologies compatible with its logic 
and rejecting non-compatible ones (Perez, 2011: 20). In relation to regimes it acts as a meta-regime, 
leading to the increasing take-up of its principles in various sectors and thus to ever stronger 
couplings between different regimes. Finally, in this phase wide-scale impacts of the surge on 
economy and society, many of those totally unforeseen and unintended, occur. In other words, the 
surge starts to shape landscape trends. An example is individualization which was strongly shaped 
and reinforced during the 20th century by the emergence of the TEP of mass consumption in a wide 
range of socio-technical systems. As a result, many alternatives, such as collective mobility, energy, 
housing, washing and cooking practices were abandoned (Schot et al., 2010). 
 
In the maturity phase the direct structuring effect of the paradigm in relation to regimes and niches 
is at its maximum. Yet as its potential starts to become exhausted, new problems and opportunities 
start to appear which cannot be fully pursued by extending the logic of the dominant paradigm. The 
scene is set then for yet another surge with the owners of financial capital ready to shift their 
investments. But this loss in visibility and direct impact does not mean that the surge loses its 
impact altogether. On the contrary, we propose that beginning from the maturity phase the surge 
gradually becomes embedded in the landscape itself. It becomes to constitute a sedimented layer of 
the landscape, a set of very deep material and ideological structures, expressed in infrastructures, 
spatial patterns of urbanization or vast webs of routine everyday practices (Shove, 2003; Edgerton, 
2007). This all-encompassing network of old and well-established technologies provides the context 
in which new niches, regimes and paradigms can emerge, interact and flourish (e.g. digital 
revolution relying on electrical networks). It also continues to shape long-term landscape trends 
long after it has ceased to be the primary locus of radical innovative activities and major source of 
economic growth (e.g. the continuing contribution of the automobile to suburbanization, 
individualization and pollution). Its high degree of embeddedness and deep-structural nature makes 
it invisible yet all the more powerful in providing “'gradients of force', that make some actions 
easier than others” (Geels and Schot, 2007: 403). The whole sequence is summarized in figure 5. 
 
4. Deep Transitions as between-surge continuities 
 
In the previous section we combined the insights of TEP and MLP to provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of great surges. Although this has brought us closer to understanding the 
dynamics of Deep Transitions we argue one additional step is needed. We therefore build on the 
notion of sedimentation introduced in the previous section suggesting that there is a fundamental 
continuity between surges. In fact, it is this very notion of between-surge continuity that makes it 
meaningful to speak about the last 200-250 years as an unfolding of a single process what we have 
called the First Deep Transition. 
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Figure 5. The multi-level explanation of a Great Surge of Development. 
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We have not yet compiled a comprehensive list of these continuities. However, based on a survey of 
literature on macro-level technological and societal changes (Mokyr, 1990; Beck, 1992; Grübler, 
2003, Misa et al., 2003; McNeill and McNeill, 2003; Christian, 2004; Arthur, 2009; Lamba, 2010; 
McClellan and Dorn, 2015; Moore, 2015), we propose a number of similarities shared by each 
surge to date: 
 Increasing resource requirements including: 
o heavy reliance on fossil fuels in maintaining the living standard of modern civilization 
and an accompanying increase in energy consumption per capita; 
o increasing demand for raw materials, products and infrastructures to satisfy “basic 
human needs”, however defined, of the members of society accompanied by increasing 
ecological footprint and the production of waste. 
 Increasing role of technologies in systems of production and consumption, leading to: 
o productivity and efficiency improvements, which have historically frequently tended to 
be offset by rises in demand stimulated by these improvements; 
o increasing complexity, variety, capital- and skill-intensity of industrial production and 
distribution activities; 
o increasing scale, scope and interconnectedness of technological infrastructures 
underpinning the functioning of modern societies with an accompanying increase in the 
risks of systemic failure; 
o increasing reliance on various technologies for the “normal” conduct of everyday life. 
 Deep-seated attitudes and beliefs about our socio-material environment: 
o instrumental view of nature, including humans, as a resource to be harnessed, controlled 
and manipulated through the application of science and technology with relatively little 
(albeit increasing) concerns about the ensuing environmental effects; 
o pervasive use of labour productivity as an adequate metric of efficiency in production 
(as opposed to resource efficiency), acquisition of ever more goods and services in 
consumption and preoccupation with economic growth as end and means on the state 
level as indicators of “societal progress” and “development”; 
o a continuing (although increasingly moderated) view of technology as inherently value-
free means and a progressive force in history enabling emancipation, empowerment and 
self-realization; 
o belief in the possibility of endless economic growth, assuming limitless supply of 
resources (or at least limitless possibilities for finding easy substitutes for scarce ones) as 
well as limitless capacity to absorb waste. 
 Specific relations between science, technology, innovation and governance: 
o a view of basic science and technology as public goods, which will bring economic 
growth and therefore deserve investment by the State. The results of these investments, 
however, can be appropriated by the private sector under the rubric of innovation; 
o increasing interconnections between science, technology and innovation, whereby 
science becomes a direct input to technological research and development activities; 
o a view according to which the developers of new products and systems are generally not 
to be held responsible for the impacts; these are perceived as negative externalities to be 
solved by the State through regulation. 
  
This list reflects a specific type of path dependency operating on a scope and time-scale beyond that 
expressed in the standard technological path-dependence literature (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989; 
Araujo and Harrison, 2002). Building on this observation we suggest that the trajectory of the First 
Deep Transition was loosely established during the first surge whereas each following one has 
complemented but also strengthened and deepened it in particular ways. It follows that – save for 
the first surge – each time a mature paradigm started to exhaust itself and new ones (re)appeared, 
the choice between competing paradigms was increasingly biased towards certain options. This 
happened because of the structuring effect of prior surges which had sedimented, become part of the 
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socio-technical landscape, and hence also part of the selection environment. The eventual outcome, 
a new surge, then simultaneously meant a notable rupture in comparison to the previous one but 
also not a complete deviation from the underlying logic of the first Deep Transition. As each new 
paradigm added weight to the existing trajectory it also made the outcomes of this large transition 
less and less reversible. This may explain, on one hand, the above observation about the resurgence 
of the principles of batch production and flexible specialization during every surge but also, on the 
other hand, why eventually all these principles were applied in a way as to deepen the logic of mass 
production and mass consumption. Figure 6 visualizes this proposition. 
 
Figure 6. Cumulative effect of Great Surges of Development: A very long term path dependency. 
 
 
But how can this deepening process through the thickening of the socio-technical landscape then 
become redirected? At this point we have to introduce a distinction between absolute and relative 
limits of each surge (and the First Deep Transition as a whole). We acknowledge that absolute 
biophysical limits to socio-material expansion do exist and that they may ultimately be reached 
should the current trends continue. The definition of such limits of the possible has been the task of 
many models of which the 'limits to growth' approach is perhaps the most famous (Meadows et al., 
1972, 2004; Turner, 2008; Bardi, 2011). However, despite some rather gloomy forecasts these limits 
have not been reached throughout the history of industrialization and modernization, and absolute 
biophysical limits have yet to constrain the First Deep Transition (though it has been argued that 
human activity has already led to overshooting particular planetary boundaries (Steffen et al., 
2015)). Therefore, the existence of these limits by themselves cannot explain why surges occur. 
What have historically prompted each surge instead are the diminishing returns of each surge, and 
more recently, the perception of various actors that we are coming close to absolute limits. We thus 
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seem to be dealing here with a notion of 'presumptive anomaly', defined as the assumption that 
“either that under some future conditions the conventional system will fail (or function badly) or 
that a radically different paradigm will do a much better job or will do something entirely novel” 
(Constant, 1980: 15). 
 
It might be helpful to think of each surge as a set of capabilities that can only yield a certain amount 
of output given the needs and goals of the actors employing it. But these needs and goals are not 
exogenous to the surge but constructed during its development. In other words, as each surge opens 
up genuinely new possibilities it also re-defines the limits of the possible: for example, mass 
production and mass consumption as we know them today were simply impossible to achieve with 
the technologies and practices of the first surge and hence impossible to formulate by a majority of 
the population as reasonable expectations. It is only when these expectations become widespread 
and normalized that the question arises whether the capabilities of the current surge are able to 
accommodate for these demands without any drop in profitability or any major harmful side-effects. 
The limits of the surge, used in this sense, then refer to limits relative to the expectations of actors 
benefiting from it. It is the perceived threat of reaching these limits that has historically led to new 
surges. In this light the TEP framework can be criticized for focusing on only one specific way in 
which these relative limits have been perceived – the exhaustion of a dominant paradigm as an 
incentive for the owners of financial capital to seek new investment opportunities. We suggest 
broadening this notion by incorporating other types of perceived limits beyond narrowly economic 
ones, e.g. increasing concerns about the accumulating environmental impacts or concerns about 
inequality and human welfare as reflected, for example, by the 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(UN, 2015). 
 
5. Deep Transitions and the future: bottom-up vs. top-down transformation pathways 
 
At this point our non-teleological and non-determinist credentials are worth repeating: the future is 
yet to be forged. Yet this does not equate to saying that each and every future avenue is equally 
likely to occur, since the possibilities for actors to exert their agency are considerably constrained 
by the socio-material outcomes of the First Deep Transition. While it is quite clear that the 
“business as usual” strategy of optimizing the existing socio-technical systems and externalizing the 
social and ecological costs cannot lead to a sustainable future, there is, in principle, nothing to stop 
the Second Deep Transition from failing, biophysical limits to growth from being reached and 
large-scale societal collapse from occurring. However, if the Second Deep Transition really takes 
place there are multiple pathways through which it might do so. In this section we explore two 
possible scenarios called partial internalization and full internalization. 
 
The partial internalization scenario implies the continuation of the currently dominant 
developmental trajectory of production and consumption aimed at high-income consumers through 
mass production methods which are capital- and skill-intensive, which aim to reap economies of 
scale through large-volume production and which rely on sophisticated knowledge systems and 
infrastructure. Actors respond to ecological challenges by introducing radical greener production 
and consumption patterns through the implementation of capital-intensive solutions (e.g. centralized 
energy production with big wind and solar farms, the expanded use of nuclear energy and further 
development of global value chain of waste products) and technologies that aim to mitigate ex-post 
the impacts of carbon-intensive development (e.g. carbon capture and storage). In this future, actors 
focus on the economic growth agenda, whereas distributional consequences of social and ecological 
costs, while recognized as important, ultimately remain of secondary importance. 
 
This path contains the danger that it will undermine the social, political and ecological conditions 
on which it is built, strongly raising the likelihood of economic stagnation, increased social 
inequality, resource-related conflicts, recurrent natural disasters and forced migration. Hence in this 
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scenario powerful forces would need to be put in place to prevent and mitigate disasters and 
conflicts, compensate for social excesses, and underwrite the legitimacy of the system, in order to 
avoid potentially catastrophic outcomes. Given the high ecological and social costs to absorb, this 
partial internalization pathway would imply constructing a new relationship between the state, the 
market, and civil society, and most likely new forms of pro-active and entrepreneurial state action 
on national and as well as city level, strong relationships between the state and business, and new 
technocratic supranational structures ensuring global coordination, which have proved difficult to 
achieve in response to recent social and economic challenges. 
 
The full internalization strategy would address the double challenge of looming ecological crisis 
and deepening social inequality in a different way. The exact directionality of this pathway of the 
Second Deep Transition is impossible to predict at the moment yet based on our tentative analysis 
of similarities between TEPs we would hazard a few educated guesses. In this scenario there will 
probably be less reliance on the state (at various levels) to redistribute ex-post the benefits of 
economic growth and manage the costs: instead distribution issues are dealt with ex-ante. Actors 
take more collective responsibility early on for the ecological and social impacts they generate. 
More emphasis might be put on social innovation. It might also imply a radical restructuring of 
current production and consumption patterns, and a move away from the principles of 
mechanization, labour-saving, reliance on fossil fuels, mass production and mass consumption, and 
centralized energy production towards more small-scale technologies and production, forms of 
collective and shared consumption, and decentralized energy production. If indeed “the greatest 
invention of the nineteenth century was the invention of the method of invention” (Whitehead, 
1925: 98) then the realization of the full internalization scenario would require yet another re-
invention of the way we innovate. 
 
In this paper we have introduced the notion of Deep Transitions to make sense of the socio-material 
challenges inherited from the past and confronting us today. We have also discussed how existing 
frameworks and insights from technology studies could be synthesized for theorizing Deep 
Transitions. In so doing we have tried to speak to a number of audiences interested in large-scale 
and long-term socio-technical systems change, including (but not limited to) the fields of Science, 
Technology and Innovation Studies, sustainability transitions, history of technology and macro-
sociology. Admittedly the resulting framework has been speculative but – owing to the novelty of 
the approach – necessarily so. Hopefully we have achieved our mission of opening up a number of 
questions to be explored in future research in order to see whether our formulation turns out to be 
accurate as well as inspiring. Based on the foregoing discussion we would like to conclude the 
paper with a brief research agenda: 
1. Detecting Deep Transitions: the notion of Deep Transitions implies wide-ranging ruptures in 
technological, organizational and institutional innovation in terms of the speed of innovation 
as well as the emergence of qualitatively new solutions (the emergence of new “species”, 
rather than the optimization of the existing ones). At the same time it also hints to the 
relative durability of various social and material between-surge continuities (see section 4 
for our tentative list). The detection and patterning of these ruptures and continuities invites 
methodological experimentation, e.g. the use of phylogenetic methods (Mesoudi, 2011; 
Valverde and Solé, 2015), Big Data analytics (Manning, 2013) or scientometric techniques 
(Rotolo et al., 2015). In particular, a quantitative mapping of patterns in the evolution of 
rules and meta-rules is a promising research avenue as both MLP and TEP literatures have 
so far identified regimes and techno-economic paradigms on the basis of qualitative 
interpretation of historical data, resulting in a certain lack of analytical rigour. 
2. Further elaboration of the framework: more conceptual work is needed on the spatial 
dimension of the surges, on the role of political economy and power conflicts in shaping the 
surges, on multi-regime and multi-niche dynamics, and on making and breaking links 
between regimes, surges and the landscape. We further suggest that the overall evolutionary 
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pattern of development of socio-technical systems might be more accurately captured by the 
notion of portfolio of directionality which would include both, niches as the sources of 
sustained variety and meta-regimes that are temporarily dominant in particular places and at 
particular times. This notion of portfolio of directionality might go a long way in explaining 
both, the high degree of continuity in long-term socio-technical change as well as occasional 
rapid discontinuities both characteristic to industrial modernity. 
3. Extended analysis of the turning points of the surges (past and present) including the role of 
wars and other landscape pressures in shaping the direction of change at critical junctions. 
Of particular interest is the emerging and possibly intensifying clash between the First and 
the Second Deep Transition. 
4. The combined use of qualitative socio-technical scenarios and quantitative modelling 
(Foxon, 2013; McDowall, 2014) to probe the possible futures of which the Second Deep 
Transition might be a part. Looking ahead up to 2050 and aiming to capture at least two 
surges these efforts might focus on the articulation of niches in which new competing TEPs 
might emerge, on multi-regime dynamics, crises and shocks through which these paradigms 
might evolve and become to compete, and on processes by which successful TEPs might 
diffuse and gain dominance in a wider variety of regimes. These scenarios could also 
explore transnational dynamics or examine how competing paradigms may be adopted in 
different regions across the world thereby avoiding a Western bias. 
 
The world is in transition and a great deal of the possible outcomes of this transition do not look 
desirable. The success of intervention ultimately depends on whether the analysts get the problem 
right. Only then are we as knowledgeable and reflexive actors of the world in a position to make an 
informed decision about the elements of the present we would like to take with us and the ones we 
should leave well behind. Only then can we devise strategic actions that cross the gap between 
where we are and where we want to be. Only then can we ensure that the unfolding of the Second 
Deep Transition would not wreak havoc on humanity and nature. The authors invite everyone to 
join them in this intellectual quest. 
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